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Governing Floods and Riots: Insurance, Risk, and 
Racism in the Postwar United States 
Uwe Lübken  
Abstract: »Zur ‘Beherrschung’ von Überschwemmungen und ‘Riots’: Versi-
cherung, Risiko und Rassismus in den USA«. In the late 1960s, the United 
States Federal Government resorted to publically funded insurance systems to 
deal with two quite different problems: floods and riots. Both programs were 
administered by the same agency, both relied heavily on the spatial mapping of 
risk, and both were haunted by problems of moral hazard. Curiously, and most 
importantly, however, riots as well as floods were viewed as “environmental 
hazards” by the insurance industry and the government agencies involved. The 
underlying assumption was that social problems could be treated as quasi-
natural hazards, i.e. as a homogeneous and unpredictable force that could be 
contained by actuarial means. Yet uprisings, civil commotions, and riots are 
not “acts of god” that are located outside of society (and neither are floods). 
This article discloses the origins of both programs, it describes their commu-
nalities and differences, and it reveals the views of those who were subject to 
racist steering practices. 
Keywords: Insurance, Risk, floods, riots, Redlining; racism, USA. 
 
Mr. Jones.  
Our companies could not insure the same properties under the same 
underwriting conditions and at the same rates. Now, if it’s insurable 
property and there are no environmental conditions, it would be in-
sured under the FAIR plan. 
Ms. Gear.  
What does ‘environmental condition’ mean? […] I’ve heard that so 
much. You know, what is ‘environmental condition’? What do you 
classify as ‘environmental condition’? Maybe then I could give you 
a reply, because I need to know what that is. 1 
On February 28, 1980, the Subcommittee on Insurance of the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, gathered to review 
“the progress of the flood, crime, and riot reinsurance program and to consider 
new authorization”. During congressional hearings a year before, questions had 
been raised as to the continued need for these programs and about whether they 
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“were operating in full accordance with congressional intent”.2 Invited to give 
statements before the committee and to submit reports were, amongst others, 
State insurance commissioners, representatives of the insurance industry, the 
Administrator of the Federal Insurance Administration, and “other knowledge-
able persons concerned about hazard litigation, protection of the environment, 
and revitalization of the Nation’s neighborhoods”.3 
What at first glance appears to have been (and most likely was) a long and 
exhausting congressional hearing unworthy of further scholarly research, raises 
a couple of interesting questions if we take a closer look. Why, one might ask, 
were such highly diverse topics such as floods and riots dealt with in the same 
hearing in the first place? Secondly, why was insurance the chosen means to 
cope with these problems? Finally, if insurance was the preferred tool to solve 
these problems, why was the Federal government involved at all and why 
wasn’t the whole matter left to the private insurance industry, as was the case 
with the actuarial management of so many other hazards such as theft, fire, car 
accidents, or death? Ultimately, the question is why the United States govern-
ment decided to use publically funded insurance systems to deal with both 
social and natural problems. 
The Problem: Floods 
In the United States, as in almost every other industrialized country, flooding 
became more and more of a problem over the course of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. With the increasing utilization of the floodplains for agri-
cultural, urban, infrastructural and industrial purposes, riverine and coastal 
settlements grew ever more vulnerable to high water levels of rivers and 
oceans. Several devastating river floods in the first three decades of the twenti-
eth century along the Mississippi River, the Ohio River, and in New England 
had clearly disclosed this vulnerability. The main response to this challenge, 
however, had remained the same ever since the Army Corps of Engineers had 
firmly established its so-called “levee-only doctrine” in the late nineteenth 
century: physical protection from flooding by dams, levees, and, later on, also 
reservoirs. With total flood damages steadily rising despite these earthen and 
concrete devices,4 it became increasingly clear, however, that structural meas-
ures were insufficient to relieve the financial burden of the state and the suffer-
ing of the people.5 Disaster relief – a Federal task since 1950 – only added to 
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the costs of flooding and, in addition, diminished the awareness of personal 
risk: “Whenever a major disaster strikes anywhere in the United States today,” 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) noted in 1966, 
“substantial public help and relief are available.”6 Together, these develop-
ments were not sustainable and called for new approaches to the flood problem. 
For several reasons, insurance seemed to be an ideal solution for this prob-
lem. Not only did it offer financial help to flood victims after a disaster (pro-
vided they had signed a policy), it also transferred risk and financial liability 
from the state (in the form of a moral or legal obligation to provide relief pay-
ments) to those potentially affected by floods. Furthermore, insurance schemes 
applied different premium rates to different regions of risk and thus encouraged 
a prudent utilization of the floodplain. The only problem was: flood insurance 
was not provided by the insurance industry. 
Unlike other hazards, extreme natural events such as earthquakes or vol-
canic eruptions are in most cases confined to a more or less demarcated geo-
graphical space which limits the number of potential customers who demand 
protection by insurance. It would be next to impossible, for example, to sell 
avalanche insurance to people in the Baltic region or, for that matter, insurance 
against tidal inundations to someone living in Switzerland. As a consequence, 
insurance companies specializing in natural hazards attract a large number of 
“bad risks”, which makes these companies extremely vulnerable to extreme 
events because too many insured persons might be affected at the same time. 
But it is not only the distribution of natural risks over space that creates prob-
lems for insurers; their distribution over time can be equally problematic be-
cause of the “highly unfavourable, if only temporary, ratio of claims to premi-
ums” immediately after a devastating event.7 In California, for example, 
earthquake premiums in 1994, the year of the Northridge disaster, amounted to 
$500 million while $11.4 billion had to be paid out for property damages.8 
Flood insurance suffers from the same structural problem.9 The demand for 
financial protection from floods is extremely volatile. As a rule, it rises tremen-
dously after a major flood event while people lose interest in signing policies 
after a couple of years without floods. Thus, private flood insurance companies 
have been made bankrupt again and again by severe inundations. In one ex-
treme case in 1899 even the office buildings of one insurance company were 
washed away by a flood in Cairo, Illinois.10 Even if a company survives, the 
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“pattern of large claims following years with few losses makes premium-
setting difficult and the funding of claims unpredictable”.11 With the damage 
potential in the floodplains (both coastal and riverine) growing at tremendous 
rates after World War II, the burden on the federal budget was increasing cor-
respondingly and new methods of dealing with this problem were sought.  
The Problem: Riots 
The lack of insurance coverage by private companies was also a key compo-
nent of another, quite different post-war problem in the United States: the de-
cline of American inner cities and the resulting uprising of impoverished peo-
ple living in dilapidated housing conditions. After the end of World War II, 
millions of African-Americans left behind a legacy of poverty and racism in the 
South and migrated to the urban centers in the North, Northeast, Midwest and 
far West.12 This process was accompanied by “white flight” to the suburbs. The 
suburban population, which was and continues to be mostly Euro-American, 
jumped from roughly 35 to 75 million between 1950 and 1970.13 Suburbaniza-
tion, officially supported by the Federal Government, allowed white Americans 
to leave “what deteriorated into inner-city reservations of racialized poverty”.14 
Thus, these processes established a unique form of post-war urban segregation 
and fostered the equation of being black with being poor and with living in a 
pathological ghetto space.  
One important but often overlooked fact in the history of inner-city ghettoi-
zation in the post-war United States is the role that racial steering practices of 
lending institutions and insurance companies played. For decades, as Gregory 
D. Squires has pointed out, “U.S. central city residents, particularly in minority 
areas, have often been unable to obtain property insurance at affordable 
rates”.15 The National Inspection Company, for example, a consulting firm 
which catered mostly to insurers, bore witness in a 1958 report on Chicago to 
the “encroachment of Negroes” and held that the “Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, 
Japanese and ‘Hillbillies’ have worked into some colored areas, particularly on 
the fringe of the cheaper or poorer districts and, in some cases, are in the same 
category with the lower-class Negroes”. As a consequence, the report, heavily 
resorting to racial and class stereotypes, demanded that any “liability in the 
areas described should be carefully scrutinized and in case of Negro dwellings, 
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usually only the better maintained, owner-occupied risks are considered ac-
ceptable for profitable underwriting.”16 
The availability of property insurance, however, is a key component of the 
status of housing conditions and of a community’s overall situation. “Insurance 
is essential to revitalize our cities,” a 1968 report to President Lyndon B. John-
son stated. “It is a cornerstone of credit. Without insurance, banks and other 
financial institutions will not – and cannot make loans.” Thus, the renovation 
and improvement of property became more difficult and mortgages were hard 
to obtain. The report gloomily continued that  
new housing cannot be constructed, and existing housing cannot be repaired. 
New businesses cannot expand, or even survive. Without insurance, buildings 
are left to deteriorate; services, goods and jobs diminish. Efforts to rebuild our 
nation’s inner cities cannot move forward. Communities without insurance are 
communities without hope.17 
The availability of reinsurance, on the other hand, “influences the capacity 
of the primary insurers to underwrite” and “permits underwriters to assume a 
larger volume of risk than would otherwise be possible.” Furthermore, “it en-
ables the insured to accept a larger amount of exposure in a particular area or 
kind of area.”18 After the violent clashes between residents of urban ghettos and 
national security forces in the 1960s, a direct result not only of dilapidated 
housing and ridiculously high rents, but also of unmet demands by the Civil 
Rights Movement and the assassination of key figures within the movement, an 
already bad situation took a turn for the worse. The economic damages result-
ing from these riots were staggering. In Watts, Los Angeles, for example, the 
1965 riots resulted in insured losses of $38 million; the 1967 Detroit riot 
caused $41.5 million and the 1967 Newark riot $11 million.19 These huge (in-
sured) losses led many insurance companies to give up property insurance in 
these areas altogether. 
Flood and Riot Insurance 
Thus, at first glance, floods and riots seemed to create similar problems in the 
postwar United States: The amount of financial damages they caused was in-
creasing tremendously and demanded special solutions; in both cases, the pri-
vate insurance market failed to deliver the protection deemed necessary and, as 
a result, the Federal government took the initiative and created state-sponsored 
systems of risk management. 
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“Flood Insurance and Crime and Riot Reinsurance” 1980, 283. 
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First attempts of the United States government to intervene in the flood in-
surance business date back to the early 1950s when record floods in Kansas 
and Missouri induced the Truman administration to take a more active course. 
In 1956, the Federal Flood Insurance Act was enacted, which envisioned a 
system in which the Federal government acted as a kind of reinsurer for flood 
insurance companies, but Congress refused to appropriate substantial amounts 
of money.20 Ten years later, however, Hurricane Betsy, which devastated large 
parts of New Orleans, triggered the Southeast Hurricane Disaster Relief Act 
which, besides authorizing relief payments to the flood victims, also mandated 
a feasibility report on a national flood insurance program. In 1968, the National 
Flood Insurance Act was finally passed, which, at least theoretically, made 
flood insurance available to all potential flood victims.21 
The 1968 Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act, too, was more or 
less a direct result of a series of catastrophes.22 It originated in the urban riots of 
the 1960s and was  
enacted to keep essential property insurance available in urban areas where the 
insurance industry had grown fearful that the riot and civil commotion hazards 
made even reasonably well-maintained buildings uninsurable.”23 
In 1968, the Hughes Report by the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders warned that if nothing was done about this problem, it might grow 
worse and affect even more cities in the future.24 Thus, under the Urban Prop-
erty Protection and Reinsurance Act, federal riot reinsurance was made avail-
able to insurance companies in states that established a Fair Access to Insur-
ance Requirements (FAIR) Plan. The National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP) worked in a similar way. Municipalities could participate in the NFIP 
(and hence their citizens could benefit from federally funded flood insurance) 
if, in turn, they agreed to establish zoning laws and building codes in order to 
guarantee a thoughtful utilization of the floodplain.25 
The two programs were institutionally joined in their first year of existence 
when in 1968 the Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) was established 
within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) on August 
1, 1968, to administer federal flood, riot, and crime insurance programs. The 
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FIA was later transferred to the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) but has retained autonomous status under its new umbrella organiza-
tion. Besides being administered by the same agency, the two programs also 
had a lot in common in a functional sense. Both were based on mapping re-
gions of risk. This is, of course, a standard procedure for almost every branch 
of the insurance business, but the geographical containment of hazards acquires 
special importance where the spatial distance between (real or imagined) 
“good” and “bad” risks is often only a few feet up the hill to higher ground (as 
in the case of floodplains) or one or two blocks (as in the case of redlining 
practices). The NFIP mapped the flood risk by publishing Flood Insurance 
Rate Maps (FIRM), while the riot reinsurance program had to identify hazard-
ous urban areas.26  
Furthermore, both programs were haunted by moral hazard and fraud. With 
the Federal government acting as an insurer of last resort and as such assuming 
the entire (floods) or at least large parts (riots) of the financial risk, there was a 
high incentive for property owners, the private insurance industry, and some-
times even city officials to actively create or redefine the very events they were 
supposed to be protected from, i.e. fires and floods. The riot reinsurance pro-
gram, for example, triggered arson. In 1973, the Ohio FAIR Plan Underwriting 
Association ascribed eighty percent of its losses to arson or “suspicious cir-
cumstances”.27 Cleveland, Ohio, accounted for no less than 1,593 arson inci-
dents in 1974 and 1,976 incidents in 1975. Paid claims by the fire insurance 
underwriters in that city from November 1970 through September 1973 amoun-
ted to $2,386,457.28 The American Insurance Association complained that the 
1978 amendment to the Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act (the 
so-called Holtzman amendment), which requested rate parity between conven-
tional insurance policies and those created under the FAIR Plans, had made the 
latter “a dumping ground for high risks,” that “would provide a disincentive for 
sound housing management and would encourage arson.”29 
With regard to the National Flood Insurance Program, the AIA warned that 
“the program will prove counterproductive because the premium subsidies and 
loss payments will actually encourage irresponsible construction and result in 
added loss of life and property.”30 Indeed, one of the most important problems 
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30  Testimony of George K. Bernstein on behalf of the American Insurance Association, in 
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of the NFIP were “Repetitive Loss Properties” (RLPs), i.e. properties that had 
been damaged twice or even more often. Contrary to the practices in the private 
insurance industry, the NFIP decided to continue insuring such bad risks. Con-
sequently a huge percentage of all NFIP claims were made by property owners 
who had been affected by flooding before (more than 25 percent, for example, 
in 1998).31 
Riots as “Environmental” Hazards 
The most striking similarity, however, is that floods as well as riots were 
treated as “environmental hazards” by the insurance industry and the govern-
ment agencies involved. While this is not so surprising as far as floods are 
concerned (although the more recent literature on the history of natural hazards 
and catastrophes convincingly contests the view that such events are entirely 
“natural”), it is remarkable in a policy debate about riots.32 The February 1980 
hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Insurance on the progress of the 
flood, crime, and riot reinsurance program is especially interesting insofar as it 
not only illustrates the insurance industry’s view on the “nature” of riots (as 
well as floods); it also displays the citizens’ criticism and resistance against this 
naturalization of social problems. 
The American insurance business had originally supported the 1968 Urban 
Property Protection and Reinsurance Act. George K. Bernstein pointed out in 
1968 that the organization he directed, the American Insurance Association, 
“was among the leading proponents of both the National Flood Insurance Pro-
gram and the Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Program”.33 After 
nearly 12 years of operation, however, the industry’s perspective had changed. 
James E. Jones, Jr., the AIA’s government affairs representative, now called for 
a termination of the Federal program since it had outlived its existence. Jones 
acknowledged that the program had been successful in providing “coverage in 
urban centers for essential property insurance”.34 However, he also told Senator 
Stewart, who was presiding over the hearings, that “our companies believe that 
the potential for riots and exposure to riot losses have greatly diminished. Pri-
vate reinsurance is, today, available. We urge you to finalize the liquidation of 
the Federal riot reinsurance program.”35 In a statement prepared for the January 
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1980 hearing, Jones explained that almost four million new and renewal poli-
cies had been issued by FAIR Plans over the last five years. 
Yet, a more substantial reason why the AIA demanded the termination of 
the program – besides the decreasing threat of riots and the growing availability 
of private property insurance in the inner cities – was very likely the fact that 
the losses encountered exceeded the premiums earned by more than $11 mil-
lion. “When one considers that companies have also incurred substantial ex-
penses to pay for state premium taxes, agents’ commissions, administrative 
costs, etc.,” Jones continued, “state FAIR plans have been an utter disaster for 
private insurers, and the losses generated by those plans have prevented the 
companies from expanding their voluntary operations.”36 
“Back of the Bus” Insurance 
The image that representatives of the insurance industry painted of their role in 
the riot reinsurance program was one of generous companies who had more or 
less sacrificed themselves in order to offer financial protection to inner-city 
residents. Despite the fact that they encountered huge losses, the homeowner 
policies they offered under the FAIR umbrella were allegedly equal in both rate 
and content to conventional policies. This view, however, was challenged by 
those for whom the lack of inner-city insurance coverage was a first-hand ex-
perience and not just the result of a technical report. Juanita Gear, for example, 
who represented the South Austin Coalition Community Council, a Chicago 
neighborhood organization, questioned the equality of insurance coverage 
under the FAIR Plans and conventional policies respectively, and demonstrated 
that parity existed in theory only. In practice, FAIR Plans were either more 
expansive or they provided less protection than conventional policies.37  
Gear pointed out that clients of FAIR Plan policies often paid two to five 
times more than those who were able to insure their property conventionally. 
Also, FAIR Plans in most cases did not include theft or liability coverage. And 
even after Congress had passed the Holtzman Act demanding rate parity, 11 of 
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the 28 FAIR Plans did not comply with this mandate. Insurance companies did 
not hesitate, however, to broaden the categories of risk that could be insured 
under the new program so that the FAIR Plans, once designed for only those risks 
in specifically defined riot affected areas, are now the major insurer of good risks in 
neighborhoods that were not then and never have been subject to extreme environ-
mental hazards.  
As a result, in 1980, more than 1,000,000 homeowners and businessmen 
were “relegated” to the state FAIR Plans. In Illinois alone, the number of FAIR 
insured homes and businesses rose from 44,600 in 1975 to over 76,000 in 
1979.38 
The most insulting aspect of the FAIR Plan system, however, was the spatial 
segregation it produced. An insurance map of Chicago, for example, showed a 
considerable overlapping of areas with high FAIR Plan coverage with pre-
dominantly African-American neighborhoods. “If you notice where the black-
out is, the red, which we indicate as redlining,” Gear pointed out, “is the area 
which is predominantly black. OK? To the north, which is predominantly white 
[…] the insurance companies write without any problem whatsoever.” When 
asked by Senator Stewart whether one could purchase homeowner’s insurance 
under the FAIR Plan in those areas, Juanita Gear replied: 
Yes, but why should you get FAIR plan homeowner’s [insurance] when you 
could have conventional insurance? Why are you segregating us differently 
from the conventional world? Why can’t you have complete conventional in-
surance if it’s available and there is nothing wrong with your policy?39 
AIA director George K. Bernstein finally acknowledged the existence of dif-
ferences between FAIR and conventional plans but tried to explain them with 
different loss situations. The separation of different regions of risk was a pre-
requisite for a successful operation of the FAIR program, he argued: “And 
that’s exactly what FAIR plans are for: to recognize the fact that in key urban 
areas you must make a separate market”.40 Gear did not oppose the creation of 
a separate market; she questioned, however, the criteria on the basis of which a 
specific property was categorized as a FAIR Plan property. For insurance com-
panies, she held, the most important factor was not the individual risk of a 
building, but its location inside an allegedly hazardous area. “I know for a fact 
that insurance companies took zip codes – okay? and placed them on the FAIR 
plan because of geographical location or because of the age of the dwelling,” 
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Juanita Gear explained. 41 Nine out of ten of Chicago’s 76,000 FAIR Plan poli-
cyholders lived in the city’s South and Westside neighborhoods, she continued: 
the same neighborhoods that housed, “by no small coincidence,” almost 90 
percent of the city’s minority population.42 
Thus, by its segregative effects, the FAIR Plan reintroduced and legalized to 
a certain extent the decades-old and prohibited practice of redlining.43 Even 
worse, it had “a definite racial component”, and reminded many African-
Americans of the “separate but equal” doctrine which basically held that segre-
gation was not discrimination as long as the facilities for different parts of the 
population were “equal”.44 “Perhaps the best way to demonstrate the serious 
implications of adopting so naïve a policy as ‘separate but equal’ insurance 
availability,” Gear reminded her audience during the hearing in 1980, “is to 
point out that residents of my neighborhood now commonly refer to the Illinois 
FAIR Plan as ‘back of the bus’ insurance.”45 
Conclusion 
The somewhat strange parallels between flood and riot (re)insurance are based 
on the assumption that both are “catastrophal” risks, i.e. events with a low 
probability of occurrence but a very high damage potential.46 Unlike car acci-
dents or theft, these risks are difficult if not impossible to contain by probabilis-
tic methods and hence extremely hard to model and to translate into actuarial 
terms.47 One of the main problems in dealing with both floods and riots is that 
                                                             
41  U.S. Senate, “Flood Insurance and Crime and Riot Reinsurance” 1980, 302. 
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46  This view was already expressed in the Advisory (Hughes) Report to President Johnson in 
1968. See also Statement submitted by James E. Jones, Jr., Alliance of American Insurers, 
in U.S. Senate, “Flood Insurance and Crime and Riot Reinsurance” 1980, 283-284. 
47  See Lockett 1980; Greene 1976; Moss 2002. 
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years with huge (insured) losses are followed or preceded by years with hardly 
any damage at all. “Civil Disorder Losses”, for example, amounted to $38 
million in 1965 and to $67 million in 1967, but to only one million dollars in 
1966.48 Thus, in order to provide insurance coverage for those affected by these 
events, the Federal government in both cases stepped in as an insurer of last 
resort.49 
Here, however, the commonalities end. Both programs rely heavily on the 
geographical mapping of risk but while this is a sound (and indeed indispensa-
ble) policy as far as flood insurance is concerned, it represents a racist strategy 
when applied to allegedly “riot-prone” areas. By characterizing whole blocks, 
neighborhoods, or even zip code areas as “hazardous”, rather than looking at 
individual buildings or businesses, the FAIR Plans and the companies involved 
fostered racial stereotypes and severely limited both the quality and quantity of 
insurance protection available in those inner-city areas. The underlying as-
sumption was that social problems could be treated as quasi-natural hazards, 
i.e. as a homogeneous, yet unpredictable force that could (literally) be con-
tained by actuarial ghettoization. From this perspective, every citizen who was 
living in one of these specified areas became a potential rioter. Uprisings, civil 
commotions, riots, etc., however, are not “acts of God” that are located outside 
of society (nor are floods, by the way50) and hence they require other solutions 
than racist steering practices.  
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